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Value Capture: A Valid Means of Funding PPPs? 
 
 
Abstract: This paper considers the use of value capture (VC) as a means of financing public-
private partnerships (PPPs) in the United Kingdom (UK). Although some VC techniques are 
used in the UK, they are employed more widely in the United States of America. After 
considering the traditional approach to financing UK PPPs, this paper describes the main VC 
finance instruments. The findings of a series of case studies are then presented and conclusions 
drawn. While VC financing may prove unpopular with those bearing the cost of infrastructure 
improvements, it is recommended that such instruments are considered by UK policy makers. 
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Value Capture: A Valid Means of Funding PPPs? 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The funding of infrastructure projects has become increasingly complex, particularly in the last 
two decades. Previously, such projects were typically funded directly by government, with 
contributions from users either directly or indirectly (e.g., with respect to transit-related projects 
through fares, fuel taxes and vehicle registration). The issue of who should pay is important, 
and if the paradigm is that improvements only result in increased user convenience then users 
should bear the cost. However, the benefits are often wider (e.g., new schools or improved 
transit links may lead to capital gains accruing to property owners). Moreover, the financing 
issue is complicated by factors such as environmental impact costs and to what extent these 
should be borne by future generations.  
Recent years have seen greater private sector involvement in the funding of public sector 
infrastructure projects, together with their design, construction and operation through Private 
Finance Initiative (PFI)/Public Private Partnership (PPP) contracts. Although there are a variety 
of arrangements that fall under the PPP umbrella, the most controversial remain those 
containing PFI characteristics. The use of private money to finance public sector infrastructure, 
such as schools and hospitals, was deemed to be flawed from the outset as public money was 
cheaper to borrow. However, the proponents of utilising private funding maintained that 
efficiencies gained in the construction and operating phases of the contract would compensate 
for higher interest rates. Moreover, the availability of private finance meant more projects could 
be undertaken than under conventional procurement; although this latter argument is weakened 
with the economic recession and the reluctance of banks to lend.  
This paper examines value capture (VC), a method employed in the United States of 
America (USA) which has gained popularity in recent years, particularly with respect to the 
repayment of transit PPP finance, because it is perceived as being socially equitable since it 
transfers some of the financial burden to users and others who will benefit from the new or 
improved infrastructure. In terms of format, the paper begins with an overview of the financing 
of PPPs. This is followed by a discussion of value creation and VC, including the main VC 
instruments. After outlining the methodology, four case studies that have employed various VC 
instruments are presented and discussed. Finally, conclusions are drawn. 
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THE FINANCING OF PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 
 
Criticising the use of PPPs, and its forerunner the PFI, has been the focus of many UK studies 
(e.g., Edwards and Shaoul, 2003; Broadbent et al., 2008; Pollock and Price, 2008). The number 
and value of UK projects grew steadily until 2007 (Her Majesty’s Treasury (HMT), 2006) when 
the banking crisis began to impact upon lending. Traditionally, major PPP projects that availed 
of private finance used a combination of debt and equity with their respective mix typically 
being 90% and 10%1. Initially, the debt consisted of bank lending and bonds, the latter being 
backed by the monoline industry2 which guaranteed repayment if an issuer defaulted. However, 
following the 2007 housing market decline, this industry collapsed resulting in the closure of 
the wrapped bond market (BBC, 2009). Consequently, the only viable source of finance for 
infrastructure projects was banks; however the demise of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 
meant the global lending market dried up as interbank confidence fell (Connolly and Wall, 
2011). 
Notwithstanding the aforementioned criticisms, two significant characteristics of PFI may 
explain its ongoing attractiveness (Gregory and Dawber, 2012). Firstly, while accounting rule 
changes mean most projects now appear ‘on balance sheet’ in accounting terms, the liabilities 
are excluded from calculations of overall public sector net debt and a PFI deal has less 
immediate impact on a public body’s capital budget than a traditionally-procured project. 
Secondly, while not without its complications, PFI is relatively straightforward, especially 
following the establishment of contract templates and centres of expertise (nationally and 
internationally). 
The former Labour Government proposed a number of initiatives to try to ensure that viable 
PPP projects proceeded despite a lack of funding. These included mini-perm3 structures 
(KPMG, 2009) and HMT lending (HMT, 2009). However, only a few PPPs used mini-perms 
(KPMG, 2009) and only one major PPP was partly financed by HMT (National Audit Office, 
2010). When the UK Coalition Government came into power in 2010 it announced major 
changes to the PPP system and a major capital investment programme using money from both 
pension funds and overseas, it also stated it would increase the value for money (VFM) obtained 
from future projects (BBC, 2010, 2011). However, whilst both these sources are not 
conventional debt they still result in future generations of taxpayers paying for assets from 
which they may not personally benefit.  
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The issue of whether PPPs provide VFM has been a subject of great academic interest. 
Whilst Heald (2003) saw the potential for VFM from PPP projects, such as the improved 
management of construction, he also believed it was undermined by an appraisal process that 
was subject to excessive gaming. Shaoul (2005) also felt that the appraisal process was flawed, 
leading to a loss of benefits for the wider public, and redistributed income to an elite few, 
particularly ‘financial institutions whose loans are effectively underwritten by the taxpayers’ 
(p. 465). Similar arguments have been posited by Froud and Shaoul (2001) and Broadbent et 
al. (2003). A more equitable approach would be for those who benefit to share the cost; this is 
the rationale underpinning VC. 
 
 
WHAT IS VALUE, HOW IS IT CREATED AND WHO CAPTURES IT? 
 
Drawing on the resource-based theory of the firm, a resource is considered to be valuable if it: 
exploits opportunities and/or neutralises threats; allows customer needs to be better satisfied; 
or enables a firm to satisfy needs at lower costs than competitors (Barney, 1991). When 
assessing value, it is useful to distinguish between ‘use value’ and ‘exchange value’ (Lepak et 
al., 2007). Use value refers to the specific quality of a new product or service as perceived by 
users in relation to needs; it is subjective and individual specific. Exchange value refers to the 
monetary amount realised when the exchange of the new product or service occurs; VC is the 
realisation of exchange value. 
Inanimate resources are incapable of transforming themselves into anything other than 
what they are and need to be developed before they can contribute to the production of new use 
values. However, added exchange value may not necessarily be created; this depends upon the 
relative amount of value that is subjectively realised by a target user. Moreover, this subjective 
value realisation must translate into the user’s willingness to exchange a monetary amount. Two 
key assumptions underpinning this are: the monetary amount exchanged exceeds the producer’s 
costs of creating the value; and the monetary amount that a user will exchange is a function of 
the perceived difference between the new value created and the closest alternative. 
Value creation requires more than simply understanding what a customer or society is 
willing to pay, it requires recognising that multiple users exist in concert not isolation (Lepak 
et al., 2007). Moreover, as the knowledge of potential users and the context in which they make 
evaluations about newly created value are relevant, how value is captured must be considered. 
Two key concepts determine which party captures the newly created value: competition and 
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isolating mechanisms. As novelty and appropriateness increase so does use and exchange value, 
leading to limited supply and high demand. Consequently, competition is then likely to ensue, 
increasing supply and probably leading to a fall in exchange value to where supply equals 
demand. Therefore, competition can help explain why value slips. However, in some cases, 
competition is limited and supply does not equal demand, thus offering the potential for greater 
VC. 
An isolating mechanism is any knowledge or physical or legal barrier that prevents 
replication of the value-creating product or service by a competitor, thus enabling the source of 
value creation to capture the majority of value created. Barney (1991) argues that resources 
may serve as isolating mechanisms and limit competition in cases where they are rare, 
inimitable and non-substitutable. Lepak et al. (2007) suggest that societies with specific 
resource advantages (e.g., natural resources) can capture more value than those lacking them. 
 
 
VALUE CAPTURE 
 
What is Value Capture? 
 
The presence of facilities/services (e.g., transit) can increase property values and provide 
development opportunities. In the USA, various studies have examined the impact of new or 
improved urban railway stations on land use and rents (Smith and Gihring, 2006). In general, 
these studies have concluded that rail transit significantly benefits land use and rents if a 
region’s economy is growing and a number of supportive programmes are established (e.g., the 
creation of pedestrian plazas) (Cervero, 1994). Given current funding constraints and demands 
for new and improved public services, policy makers are increasingly examining ways of 
harnessing the value that infrastructure improvements confer on surrounding areas to help fund 
such investments (Gregory and Dawber, 2012). Value capture is a potential means of financing 
infrastructure investment if some or all of the exchange value added through infrastructure 
development can be realised (Batt, 2001). This might be value that could generate an immediate 
benefit for the owner (e.g., a developer selling land near a new road access point at a higher 
price than could have been obtained beforehand). Alternatively the value may relate to owning 
a property near new infrastructure that may provide future financial value (e.g., increased 
property prices) but also immediately if, for example, the owner’s journey time is reduced. 
Therefore the project’s costs might at least be partly obtained by taxes or levies imposed on 
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those likely to benefit (rather than through user charges), making VC economically neutral as 
it imposes no distortions on economic choices because strategically-located land is limited in 
supply and therefore inelastic (Batt, 2001).  
Broadly, VC is likely to be appropriate for any new asset that increases land and property 
values. Improvements in transit increase accessibility to jobs and schools, and easily accessible 
locations tend to command higher prices. Local authorities may therefore exploit rising property 
values to encourage transit-oriented development and help fund neighbourhood improvements 
such as affordable housing. In addition, property owners and developers view transit as a highly 
desirable amenity with the potential to increase the value of surrounding properties and create 
development opportunities. The benefits (value added) of living near good public transport are 
fiscal (e.g., increased property values), social (e.g. neighbourhood revitalisation) and 
environmental (e.g., reduced traffic congestion) (Center for Transit-Oriented Development 
(CTOD), 2008). 
 
The Origins of Value Capture 
 
The concept behind VC, particularly using transit to open up new land for development and 
thereby increasing its value, is not new. It can be traced back to 19th century French physiocrats4 
whose approach compares closely to the thinking of Henry George in the 20th century (Batt, 
2001). The physiocrats believed that ‘land is the unique source of wealth’ (Quesnay, 1963, p. 
232) and, living in an age when agriculture was a major economic activity, ‘regarded production 
in terms of the transformation of materials and food taken from the land’ (Christensen, 1989, 
p. 18). George deemed that land was the property of all and that pure rent, that is income 
received from this resource, was unearned and undeserved. Therefore he believed all taxation 
should be based on land values. As the returns from land taxes continued to fall throughout the 
20th century Georgist ideas were deemed outdated (Andelson, 1979); however the merits of a 
land-value tax as one amongst many still remain and provide the rationale for VC. 
 
Value Capture Instruments 
 
The funding mechanisms and finance instruments for public sector infrastructure projects are 
illustrated in Table 1. Traditional funding mechanisms are general tax revenue and user fees, 
with the former tending to be applied when the relationship between who pays and who benefits 
is imprecise and the latter when the relationship is clearer. Table 1 classifies the beneficiaries 
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under three broad categories: unrestricted; restricted non-users; and direct users. Transportation 
improvements create benefits for the unrestricted general public within a region/jurisdiction if 
they lead to economic or social returns signified by an increase in general taxation. However, 
while such improvements may be funded from general tax revenue, disentangling the general 
public benefit from that received by individuals is difficult. Where transportation benefits are 
more directly enjoyed by direct users of transportation facilities (e.g., drivers or passengers), 
this supports the use of financial instruments such as fuel taxes or congestion charges for the 
former and fares/permits for the latter.  
Two PPPs that highlight the problems of charging users are the Skye Bridge and Dartford 
(or Queen Elizabeth II) Bridge. Whilst the latter was seen as less controversial than the former, 
which according to Shaoul et al. (2011) is ‘a political and financial debacle’ (p. 57), in both 
cases the tolls were higher than they would have been had the projects been financed by public 
debt. Indeed, following persistent public complaints, the Scottish Executive bought out the Skye 
Bridge contract and removed the tolls. 
Between the general public and direct users, there is a restricted non-user beneficiary group 
who benefit from transportation value creation because of their location (e.g., property owners 
or developers); accordingly, they are the targeted contributors of VC. The final column of Table 
1 shows the cost types (upfront capital or operating and maintenance) that can be financed by 
the finance instruments. Ideally, the cost types should be matched with the timing of 
transportation benefits. As direct users receive most of the benefit from usage, the 
corresponding revenues are primarily suitable for operating and maintenance costs; however, 
as the growth of the general tax base occurs over the life of a transportation facility, the 
increases in general taxation may be appropriate for funding both cost types. For property 
owners and developers, as the gains from enhanced locational advantages are realised mostly 
upon completion of transportation facilities, VC policies are typically applied to capital costs. 
For example, negotiated exactions are often only used to reduce the fixed cost for the right-of-
way. However, as transportation utility fees are more closely related to usage they may be more 
suitable for operating and maintenance costs. 
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Table 1 
Funding Mechanisms and Finance Instruments 
 
Funding 
Mechanisms Beneficiaries Benefit Measurement Finance Instruments Cost Types 
 
 
  
Upfront 
Capital 
Operating and 
Maintenance 
General tax 
revenue 
Unrestricted General public Increase in general 
taxation 
Sales and income 
taxes 
  
Value 
capture 
Restricted non-users Property owners Land value growth Land value tax   
   Property tax growth Tax increment 
financing 
  
   Assessed special 
benefits 
Special assessment 
district 
  
   Transportation utility Transportation 
utility fees 
  
  Developers Off-site development 
opportunities 
Development impact 
fees 
  
   Off-site access 
benefits 
Negotiated 
exactions 
  
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Funding 
Mechanisms Beneficiaries Benefit Measurement Finance Instruments Cost Types 
 
 
  
Upfront 
Capital 
Operating and 
Maintenance 
   Development 
privileges 
Joint development   
   On-site development 
opportunities 
Air rights   
User fees Direct users Drivers Fuel consumption Fuel taxes   
   Mileage Mileage-based 
charges 
  
   Vehicle types Vehicle sales tax, 
license fees 
  
   General access rights Tools   
   Demand controlled 
access rights 
Congestion charges   
   Rights to incur 
environmental 
impacts 
Environmental taxes   
  Passengers Ridership Fares/permits   
Source: Adapted from Lari et al. (2009) 
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As transportation improvements may create value in different ways simultaneously, the 
VC finance instruments shown in Table 1 can be applied individually or combined to suit 
specific circumstances. However, the total level of VC cannot exceed the total benefits created; 
otherwise the finance instruments would negate the economic rationale of development. 
Drawing upon relevant literature (e.g., GVA Grimley, 2004; CTOD, 2008; Lari et al., 2009; 
Levinson and Istrate, 2011), the VC finance instruments which arise in the case studies (Land 
Value Tax, Tax Increment Financing, Special Assessment District, Development Impact Fees 
and Joint Development) are now described and evaluated on the basis of whether they are 
economically efficient, equitable, sustainable and feasible. 
Economic efficiency relates to the instrument’s ability to allocate resources efficiently, and 
refers not only to its capacity to equate marginal benefits and costs of development but also to 
user charges. Equity addresses the fairness of resource allocation (e.g., the distribution of 
benefits across different social strata and how the finance burden is allocated across various 
income groups). Sustainability considers whether the instrument is a reliable source of revenue 
in terms of its adequacy, growth potential, stability and predictability. Finally, feasibility is 
evaluated in terms of each instrument’s political acceptability and administrative ease. 
 
Land Value Tax (LVT) 
This impacts on property owners and reforms property tax by separating the value of a property 
associated with land from that associated with the building. As LVT is levied to capture the 
general increase in land values due to improved accessibility from transit networks, it is more 
appropriate for funding a comprehensive programme than a single project. Globally, this is the 
most commonly applied VC instrument, having been adopted in Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand, and to a lesser extent in the USA. 
• Economic efficiency – a strong case can be made on efficiency grounds as contributions 
towards the financing are aligned with the benefits derived by landowners in the form of 
higher values. Although a pure land tax is preferred to one on buildings due the fixed supply 
of land, this is rare as land taxes are likely to be slightly regressive in terms of ability-to-
pay (equity) and may prove politically challenging due to their high visibility and potential 
unpopularity (feasibility). Consequently, the most common form of LVT is a split-rate tax 
that charges land at a higher rate than buildings as taxing land at a higher rate results in 
little economic distortion because its supply is fixed. 
• Equity – the primary beneficiaries of LVT are office property owners in high land value 
locations and owners of single-family homes in middle- and upper-class neighbourhoods. 
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While LVT tends to produce favourable results in terms of benefit equity, it is likely be 
slightly regressive in terms of ability-to-pay. 
• Sustainability – LVT can provide a sustainable revenue source, with its broad base meaning 
that a fairly low tax rate is adequate. While the growth potential is modest, LVT is fairly 
stable and resistant to economic cycles; although recent housing market troubles suggest 
that major corrections in property prices, though rare, might limit its value as a counter-
cyclical revenue instrument.  
• Feasibility – administratively, while LVT is fairly easy to implement, accurately 
determining the value of land and buildings separately can be challenging. Pressures from 
landowners to reassess property values downward can make LVT difficult politically, 
especially given its high visibility. 
 
Tax Increment Financing (TIF) 
Under TIF a region targets a district, usually an established neighbourhood, for economic 
development and finances this through property tax revenues generated from the growth in the 
district’s assessed property values. TIF is self-financing because it permits new development 
without reducing regional tax revenues. Once the project is completed and the TIF bond repaid, 
the tax base is restored. TIF is used widely in the USA and is being employed in Scotland 
(Scottish Futures Trust, 2011). 
• Economic efficiency – this is dependent on whether the project delivers local benefits in 
the form of property value appreciation. Regarding transportation, TIF may be more 
suitable for subway/elevated systems as these operate at higher average speeds and serve 
more densely populated locations than light rail or streetcar networks and consequently 
create larger increments in land value. Concerning general economic development, while 
property values may increase within a TIF district, this localised effect may come at the 
expense of growth in the larger jurisdiction. 
• Equity – requiring those who receive a disproportionate benefit from transportation 
improvements to make greater contributions towards its financing promotes benefit equity. 
Where property taxes are used as the basis for TIF financing, those generated within the 
district are not available to overlapping jurisdictions. Hence, adjoining areas may face 
pressure to provide increased services without any corresponding increase in revenues. 
Moreover, TIF typically does not operate on the basis of ability-to-pay. For example, if a 
transportation improvement creates appreciation in local residential property values, TIF 
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districts may place an increased burden on lower/fixed-income households, either directly 
through property tax increases or indirectly through rent increases.  
• Sustainability – the revenue base for TIF is limited as it is typically applied to a specific 
location near a transportation improvement. However, as a project-specific financing 
technique, it should be suitable. 
• Feasibility – in terms of political feasibility, as TIF-financed projects are generally 
perceived to ‘pay their own way’ this tends to increase public acceptance. However, their 
administrative feasibility is less compelling given their establishment and operation 
involves compliance with time-consuming legal requirements, especially where bond 
financing is involved. 
 
Special Assessment District (SAD) 
At a time when increasing expectations are being placed on government finances and public 
service provision, a SAD5 provides an opportunity to widen local choice by promoting 
partnership between business and local government to develop projects and services within a 
clearly defined commercial area (Belfast City Council, 2007). It involves charging property 
owners (typically businesses) within designated areas an agreed levy based on the property’s 
rateable value to fund infrastructure development fully or partially. The rationale is that the 
investment will generate benefits for the areas’ businesses because the value of land and 
property will rise, together with region’s population which will increase the customer base. 
Legislation enabling the establishment of such districts has been passed in England, Wales, 
Scotland and the Republic of Ireland.  
• Economic efficiency – depending on the basis for setting the charge (e.g., distance from 
transportation facility or store frontage), using a SAD to apportion the cost of transportation 
improvements among direct beneficiaries can enhance economic efficiency. 
• Equity – benefit equity may be enhanced if the cost of transportation improvements is 
allocated to property owners in proportion to benefits received. While this can help rectify 
geographic inequities that exist when general taxes are used, much depends upon how the 
assessments are structured. For example, entire classes of properties (such as residential) 
may be exempted, although this does create the potential for some beneficiaries to free-
ride on others’ contributions. 
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• Sustainability – as a SAD tends to have a narrow base and raise limited revenue, it is 
unlikely to be an appropriate replacement for large-scale transportation revenue sources. 
However, SAD revenue can make an important contribution, especially to a project’s cost. 
• Feasibility – a SAD is highly visible and affected property owners will need to be 
convinced of its value or necessity before charges become politically feasible. Moreover, 
administratively, a SAD may be difficult due to the need to establish legally defensible 
methods of calculating assessments; however, once in place, it is relatively easy to operate. 
 
Development Impact Fees (DIF) 
This is a one-off fee levied on developers wishing to build in a particular area. The fee is used 
to defray the cost of expanding public services and utilities. While DIF is similar to negotiated 
exactions, the difference is that DIF can be levied for off-site services such as local roads, 
schools or parks. This technique works on the principle that government provides infrastructure 
and land development consumes it. DIF works better when there are many developers, none of 
whom has the scale to complete a joint development alone, and, in the context of transit, where 
there is a dispersed origin and destination pattern. While DIF is employed widely throughout 
the USA, its use as a means of financing transportation infrastructure is a recent phenomenon. 
• Economic efficiency – DIF has the potential to improve the efficiency of resource 
distribution by allocating most of the new development infrastructure costs to those most 
likely to benefit. Thus infrastructure users should receive price signals as to the cost of 
infrastructure provision. 
• Equity – those who contribute to the financing of new infrastructure through DIF should 
receive roughly proportional benefits. While issues of geographic equity should be minor, 
DIF is usually not set with regard to ability-to-pay. An unintended effect is that builders in 
desirable markets may ignore lower-income households and focus on higher-income 
segments if they are unable to recover DIF costs. 
• Sustainability – the revenue base of DIF is narrow since it is often targeted at new 
development; although, as it is rarely the primary source of revenue, it can replace a portion 
of general taxation and be readjusted fairly easily to take account of changes in income or 
inflation. However, if projected growth rates do not materialise, the narrower base may 
leave local jurisdictions exposed to significant financial risk. 
• Feasibility – DIF should be politically acceptable as it is not highly visible since the cost is 
usually bundled into the price of new development; administratively, it is relatively easy 
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to implement. Existing residents may favour DIF as it shields them from development 
costs, from which they may benefit. Developers may be less supportive, depending upon 
demand and their ability to recharge costs. 
 
Joint Development (JD) 
This is the development of a transit facility and an adjacent private property in which a private 
sector partner either provides the facility or makes a financial contribution to offset its costs. 
Private sector payments may take several forms, including a one-off lump sum for development 
rights, annual lease payments, financial contributions to station construction costs and fees from 
retailers that are connected to the station. There are several prominent JD examples in eastern 
Asian cities such as Hong Kong and Tokyo that have extensive railway systems, whose 
expansion is often tied to new property development. 
• Economic efficiency – as evidenced by their willingness to pay, the contributions of 
developers or tenants will coincide with their anticipated benefits from locating near a 
transportation facility.  
• Equity – since this involves voluntary transactions, it ensures benefit equity among 
participants. In terms of ability-to-pay, JD projects often attract higher-end commercial 
tenants, to the extent that JD costs are not transferred to lower-income customers or 
employees. Similarly, as residential tenants tend towards the middle to the upper end of the 
income scale, this implies a distribution of costs that is neutral to progressive with respect 
to ability-to-pay. 
• Sustainability – as the revenue base is fairly narrow, JD is unlikely to replace more 
traditional sources.  
• Feasibility – the narrow base and low visibility makes JD politically palatable to most 
residents. As JD will only be possible if the private sector anticipates an incremental 
benefit, it will not always be feasible. JD agreements are administratively complex and thus 
their transaction costs could be higher than other VC instruments.  
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
As case studies are empirical enquiries that investigate a contemporary phenomenon within its 
real-life context (Yin, 2003), they provide the opportunity to learn from real-life examples and 
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are vital in understanding social phenomena where an appreciation of context is important 
(Cooper and Morgan, 2008). The use of case studies in this context was considered appropriate 
as they provided examples of VC in operation and facilitated a cross-country comparison 
between the USA and UK. 
 
 
CASE STUDIES 
 
Wilson Yard, Chicago 
 
Chicago’s ‘L’, or elevated, trains, was privately run until 1947when the Chicago Transit 
Authority (CTA) took over its operation. The CTA’s costs rose rapidly throughout the 1970s 
and transit provision became increasingly difficult with rapid auto-dependent, low-density 
suburbanisation. With passenger numbers at their lowest in the 1990s, the service was cut 
drastically. TIF is used in Chicago, with funds are generated by the growth in the Equalized 
Assessed Valuation (EAV) of properties within a designated district over 23 years. Under state 
law, areas proposed for TIF designation must possess a range of blighting factors including: 
age; excessive vacancies; inadequate utilities; and lack of community planning. When an area 
is declared a TIF district, the amount of property tax it generates is set as a base EAV amount. 
As property values increase, property tax growth above the EAV base is used to either repay 
bonds issued to pay upfront costs and/or operating and maintenance costs. At the conclusion of 
the 23-year period, the increase in revenue over the base amount is distributed annually among 
the city’s taxing bodies. 
Wilson Station is on the Red Line, Chicago’s main and busiest ‘L’, and earned a reputation 
as one of the worst CTA-run rail stations. The Wilson Yard TIF district, a 144-acre site, was 
created in 2001. The area was home to several ethnic groups who moved in during the 1970s 
and 1980s. By 1990, about one-third of the residents were foreign-born and low-income, with 
the area suffering from deteriorating buildings and traffic congestion. However, recently, the 
neighbourhood has gentrified and property prices have risen. 
• Economic efficiency – Wilson Station is an important feature of the Wilson Yard TIF 
district. Since funds were needed to refurbish the station, the use of TIF was welcomed by 
most residents. By improving access to the neighbourhood and increasing transportation 
options, the refurbished Wilson Station also promoted horizontal equity. For example, 
businesses benefited from the increased foot traffic, and college students and staff enjoyed 
17 
 
safe and improved access to campuses. The use of TIF was also vertically equitable as 
those on low incomes are more likely to be dependent on public transportation. However, 
TIF has been criticised for using public funds to deliver projects that would have been 
provided by the private sector. Naccarato (2007) estimates that Chicago lost over $250 
million of revenue in 2002 from TIF-funded projects that would have proceeded anyway. 
• Equity – in Chicago, DIF, which increased with distance in the suburban area around the 
Chicago business district, were also applied. However, they were negatively associated 
with older housing, unemployment and poverty. While Chicago suburbs with lower 
incomes, larger minority populations and greater poverty had an interest in promoting 
rather than reducing growth, the added charges for infrastructure development reduced the 
incentive to develop in those areas.  
• Sustainability – the Wilson Yard TIF district has generated substantial revenues which 
have funded several projects. The impact of the economic downturn was minimal, with 
slight revenue dips in 2007 and 2009. Overall, annual revenues grew more than twofold 
from approximately $3 million in 2002 to $7 million in 2010.  
• Feasibility –significant institutional capacity was available to form and administer the TIF 
district, and there was no significant opposition to using TIF for station redevelopment. 
 
Portland Central Streetcar Project 
 
In the 1980s/early 1990s, downtown Portland was dominated by dilapidated warehouses and 
offices. The Portland Central Streetcar Project was intended to link Portland’s neighbourhoods 
with quality transportation and to spur development along the streetcar lines. Four streetcar 
lines (Blue, Green, Red and Yellow) were built in a series of five separate projects, funded by 
various VC instruments. The Red line involved building a light rail system connecting 
downtown Portland to Portland International Airport (Portland Streetcar Inc., 2008). In 1997, 
Bechtel Enterprises (a construction company) approached the City of Portland, Port of Portland 
(the entity overseeing the airport) and Tri-County Metropolitan Transportation District of 
Oregon (TriMet) with plans to jointly develop the Red line and Cascade Station, a 120-acre plot 
of government-owned land on the way to the airport. In 1999, Port of Portland, City of Portland, 
Portland Development Commission and TriMet signed a $125.8 million JD agreement to build 
a 5.5-mile light rail extension with four stations.  
The scheme was financed as follows: Port of Portland $28.3 million, funded by a $3 
passenger charge (levied on airlines for each passenger boarding through the airport); the City 
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of Portland $23.8 million, through TIF; TriMet $45.5 million, from general taxes; and Bechtel 
contributed $28.2 million. In return, Bechtel received an 85-year lease to develop Cascade 
Station, without paying rent and the $125 million design-build construction contract for the 
light rail without entering a bidding process.  
Two factors that created the Cascade Station development opportunity were its designation 
as a TIF district and Portland’s Urban Growth Boundary (UGB) regulations6. Property tax 
collections within the district are divided into two parts: taxes applied to the district’s assessed 
value at the time it was created; and taxes applied to the increase in value after its creation. 
Taxes collected on the frozen tax base continue to be distributed to all taxing jurisdictions; taxes 
collected on the increased value are only collected for reinvestment in the area. This enabled 
Portland to use TIF to fund its contribution to the project. The Portland UGB has resulted in 
higher land values and smaller land parcels in the city and Portland’s population growing by 
50% since 1973, while its land area has only grown by 2%. 
• Economic efficiency –properties within two blocks of the line realised 75% to 90% of the 
FAR (floor area ratio – a measure of density) allowed, compared with development at 43% 
of FAR potential for properties located more than three blocks from the line. The higher 
density of development for the closer properties translates to higher property values and 
tax revenues. Many areas near the line saw increases in property value in excess of 400% 
between 2003 and 2008, and by 2008 there was $3.5 billion of new development along 
the route (Brookings Institution, 2009).  
• Equity – to address the ‘beneficiaries pay’ principle, residential properties were charged 
half the rate of that imposed on commercial ones (Portland City Council, 2009).The use of 
TIF advanced horizontal equity as the funds were used to finance capital expenditure within 
the district. Furthermore, to the extent that lower-income people benefited more from 
transit than higher earners, vertical equity was enhanced.  
• Sustainability – TIF districts involved in funding the project were impacted by the housing 
market downturn, especially where condominiums constituted a large portion of the new 
development. 
• Feasibility – Oregon’s legislation allows TIF and SAD to be used for transportation 
projects. Through consultation, Portland received broad-based stakeholder support for their 
formation. Furthermore, the city was able to work with stakeholders to find solutions when 
problems arose. For example, it averted a political battle by exempting owner-occupied 
residential properties from paying assessments. The bond issuance, preliminary studies, fee 
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assessment, public relations management and other activities involved in TIF and SAD 
administration demand significant staff time and resources; in Portland, the institutional 
capacity to administer these existed. 
 
Crossrail 
 
This major infrastructure project consists of a high-frequency, high-capacity east-west train link 
across London, which is estimated to deliver up to 14,000 jobs between 2013 and 2015 when 
the construction phase reaches its peak and generate £1.24 billion annually for the London 
economy by 2026 (Greater London Authority (GLA), 2010). It is anticipated that Crossrail will 
bring an additional 1.5 million people within 45 minutes commuting distance of key business 
districts and that approximately 200 million passengers will travel on Crossrail annually 
(Crossrail, 2012).  
The estimated cost of Crossrail was originally £15.9 billion (Hill, 2009). Following the 
2011 Comprehensive Spending Review, the Coalition Government revised the operational start 
date from 2017 to 2018 and approved £1 billion of cost savings. GLA’s and Transport for 
London’s (TfL) contribution is approximately £7.15 billion which is to be funded as follows: 
£4.1 billion from a new business rates supplement (equivalent to LVT) (Gregory and Dawber, 
2012); £300 million from a Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL) (similar to DIF) on new 
developments across London; and Section 106 contributions of £300 million (similar to JD). 
The business rates supplement has two components: £3.5 billion to be paid by the GLA 
through borrowings; and £0.6 billion in direct contributions, which equates to the amount by 
which the income raised exceeds the financing cost of borrowing. The business rates 
supplement is fixed at 2%. Beginning in 2010 to correspond with the drawdown of the initial 
borrowings, it is levied on nondomestic London properties with a rateable value of over £55,000 
(equivalent to a SAD), with the chargeable period estimated to be between 24-31 years (GLA, 
2010). Under a Section 106 agreement (of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990), the 
developer’s contribution towards the CIL is based upon the increase in land value arising from 
the granting of planning permission (Saxer, 2000). The principle behind the CIL is that Crossrail 
represents a sizable contribution to London’s transit system; equivalent to a 16% increase in 
capacity for the whole underground and rail network. Furthermore, it is envisaged that Crossrail 
will generate wider benefits as even those developments in areas not served by Crossrail should 
gain from the improved capacity, connectivity and general economic growth.  
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• Economic efficiency – as the business rates supplement falls on those businesses likely 
to benefit from the transit infrastructure, the contributions are aligned to some extent 
with the benefits derived in the form of higher property values. 
• Equity – the business rates supplement is a flat tax levied on all non-domestic properties 
regardless of their location. It therefore falls on those businesses that stand to benefit as 
well as those who will see little benefit, and even those who may be placed at a competitive 
disadvantage as a result of new transport patterns. 
• Sustainability – the projected revenue raised through the business rates supplement is 
based upon the assumption that rateable values will increase by 15% every five years 
(except in the first five years when a growth rate of 6% is assumed). Whether this is 
realistic in the current economic climate is debatable. 
• Feasibility – similar to the Portland Project, the legislative framework through the 
Crossrail Act 2008 paved the way for the project and enabled the various finance 
instruments to be enacted. 
 
The Northern Line Extension 
 
This £950m project, which will extend one of London Underground’s oldest lines, includes two 
extra stations, and will subsequently connect an existing station with the Battersea area (TfL, 
2012). An innovative funding package has been agreed under which the GLA will borrow the 
cost of development from the Public Works Loan Board, with the government guaranteeing the 
repayment to minimise borrowing costs. The loan will be repaid by revenue raised from local 
regeneration projects benefitting from the new transport links. The two sources of revenue will 
be contributions from developers under Section 106 agreements or CILs; and the growth in 
business rates revenue from a new enterprise zone (similar to a TIF district), which will stay in 
operation for at least 25 years. While an enterprise zone usually offers businesses a rates 
discount to stimulate growth and investment, in this instance it is used purely as a mechanism 
to fund the Northern Line extension. It is anticipated that the local economy will benefit from 
the creation of 25,000 new jobs and 16,000 new homes (TfL, 2012). 
The Local Government Finance Act 2011 enabled local authorities in England and Wales 
to retain a portion of any increase in business rates within their jurisdiction and gave councils 
the opportunity to invest on the basis of their potential share of such an increase. In this case, 
Battersea and Wandsworth Councils are able to borrow against future tax revenue to provide 
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up-front project funding. In addition, in the 2011 National Infrastructure Plan (HMT, 2011), the 
government stated that it would consider allowing local borrowing against future receipts of a 
CIL.  
• Economic efficiency – much depends on whether the project delivers benefits locally 
through property value appreciation; however, the prospects are positive since subway 
systems operate at higher average speeds than light rail networks and serve densely 
populated locations, thus they are likely to create large land value increments. Although, 
general economic development can be limited if investment is steered towards less 
productive locations.  
• Equity – as the project is being financed by developers and businesses, those who will 
receive disproportionate benefit from the project will be responsible for financing the 
improvements. However, this may not take account of ability-to-pay and developers may 
focus on high-income segments of the market if they are unable to recover the CIL costs. 
Furthermore, as property taxes are being used as the basis for financing, the taxes generated 
within the enterprise zone are not available to overlapping jurisdictions, which may face 
pressure to provide increased services without any corresponding increase in revenues. 
• Sustainability – the revenue base is limited as it applies to a specific location. While if 
projected growth rates do not materialise, leaving the councils exposed, the government 
has guaranteed the loan repayment.  
• Feasibility – the plans were welcomed by local residents, with around three quarters of 
those responding to the third public consultation returning positive or neutral comments. 
Additionally, in terms of political feasibility, the financing of the project was facilitated by 
the Local Government Finance Act 2011. Although, while the 2012 Budget committed 
investment towards TIF projects of up to £150 million, with money available from 2013-
2014, the number of TIF schemes that are allowed will initially be limited (HMT, 2012b). 
 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
Whilst the concept of VC is not totally alien to the funding of PPPs in the UK, or countries such 
as Australia, Poland and Portugal (McIntosh, 2011; Medda and Modelewska, 2011; Martínez 
and Viegas, 2012), it is more widely applied in the USA. Notwithstanding, the concept that 
those who either directly or indirectly benefit from infrastructure development should share 
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some of the financial burden seems fairer than servicing debt from general taxation as 
traditionally occurs with PPP projects. Charging all taxpayers contradicts the benefit principle, 
whereby all benefits from public expenditure are ‘both measurable and allocable to individual 
households’ (Meerman, 1980, p.45). Hansjurgens (2000) contrasts this with the ability-to-pay 
principle, when no evaluation of ‘both the benefits of public expenditures and the corresponding 
tax burden’ (p. 97) is taken by taxpayers. Whilst the emphasis in this paper has been on rail 
networks, VC applies equally well to roads (Batt, 2001). Therefore if governments around the 
world wish to stimulate economic recovery via a capital investment programme using PPPs, 
they should implement schemes which can be funded by those benefitting from various projects. 
Such Keynesian views about public spending during recessionary periods liberates politicians 
to build up budget deficits and supports Buchanan’s (1987) view that people suffer from “fiscal 
illusion” and prefer debt to taxation. However, given Buchanan’s assertion that it is immoral 
for one generation to burden another for its own benefit, VC transfers some of the cost of 
infrastructure projects to those who benefit, either directly or indirectly. 
This paper presents five VC finance instruments: LVT, TIF, SAD, DIF and JD. Some of 
these target property owners, while others target developers. Moreover, the instruments differ 
in how, when and where they may be utilised. They can be applied individually or combined to 
meet specific situations, and they also yield different outcomes, which can be assessed relative 
to four criteria: economic efficiency, equity, sustainability, and feasibility. An evaluation of the 
finance instruments employed in each of the case studies is summarised in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 
Summary of Case Study Finance Instruments 
 
 Economically 
Efficient Equitable Sustainable Feasible 
Wilson Yard, Chicago [TIF] Yes Mixed Yes Yes 
PortlandCentral Streetcar 
Project[SAD, TIF] Yes Yes Mixed Yes 
Crossrail [DIF, LVT & SAD] Yes Mixed Mixed Mixed 
Northern Line Extension [DIF, 
JD &TIF] Mixed Mixed Yes Yes 
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Drawing upon the literature and the case studies presented above, a number of issues 
relevant to those considering the use of VC are highlighted. TIF typically does not generate 
additional tax revenues; rather it transfers them from one administrative area to another. 
Moreover, while TIF-funded projects can stimulate growth, if property values do not increase, 
taxpayers can end up funding a project which they assumed would only proceed if financed by 
local businesses. Furthermore, the use of TIF requires significant institutional capacity, 
community support and agreement among taxing authorities. Notwithstanding, the use of TIF 
is growing in England with projects planned in Sheffield, Leeds and Manchester, together with 
six projects underway in Scotland (Gregory and Dawber, 2012; Ward, 2012; Gordon, 2013).  
The evidence suggests that a SAD can only succeed where a genuine PPP exists based on 
a clear, focused and measurable business plan, together with trust amongst the private and 
public sector parties illustrated by the existence of engagement and funding in advance of the 
SAD development (Mitchell, 2008). SADs must be carefully designed and implemented to 
minimize inequities; moreover, greater engagement and dialogue might not necessarily mean 
the additional tax burden on business will be accepted. Where the conditions are right, a levy 
up to 1% of the rateable value is generally acceptable to businesses (Belfast City Council, 
2007); levies greater than this have yet to gain the broad support of UK retailers and trade 
organisations, with 88% of levies being 2% or less (Sandford, 2013). Examining the processes 
through which SADs have travelled from the USA to the UK, Cook (2008) highlighted that 
they were much smaller in scale than those in the USA and stressed the complexities associated 
with replicating policies adopted in one jurisdiction in another. 
While each of the VC instruments discussed could potentially be used to fund transit 
projects, their successful application, either individually or in combination, depends on factors 
such as the enabling environment, stakeholder support and institutional capacity. For example, 
a robust legislative framework is required for JD, DIF and TIF, and VC works best if local 
communities hold genuine dialogue and create an environment where further engagement can 
take place. Neighbourhood residents are often the most affected by TIF-produced changes and 
businesses need to be closely engaged in decisions to introduce supplementary rates or SADs. 
Thus a regional framework of support is required to establish partnership structures and 
maintain their effectiveness. Consequently it is imperative that there is a buy-in from the 
business community and government agencies to ensure commitment to meeting the long-term 
needs of, for example, SADs as a delivery mechanism for economic development and 
regeneration. Moreover, significant staff time and resources are required to administer VC 
instruments such as TIF and SAD, while clear policy guidelines are needed to undertake JD. 
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According to HMT (2012a), experience of past PPPs suggests that a number of aspects are 
not working effectively, including a lack of transparency of the future liabilities created by 
PPPs, which has led the Government to take steps to address these concerns. These include 
publishing Whole of Government Accounts (WGA) in order to improve the transparency of 
PPP liabilities. These show that the liability for future capital payments for 2011/12 was £36.1 
billion (increasing from £28.1 billion in 2009/10 and £32.0 billion in 2010/11) (Office for 
Budget Responsibility (OBR), 2013). Although, given the recognition of assets and liabilities 
in the National Accounts is based upon who bears most of the financial risk, rather than on who 
has effective control as with WGA (Heald and Georgiou, 2011; OBR, 2013), the figure 
provided in the National Accounts for 2011/12 was £5 billion. As the underlying principle of 
VC is that those who benefit pay, PPPs funded in this manner should reduce the level of 
financial liabilities for future taxpayers. As illustrated in Table 1, VC mechanisms can be used 
to fund capital and/or operating and maintenance costs, therefore while the overall funding 
requirement may be similar to that for existing PPPs, the principle of who services this liability 
is different. However, this does not alleviate the need to adequately account for these shifting 
liabilities nor remove the challenge of forecasting and measuring value change (e.g., for 
example increases or otherwise in land and property) to provide confidence around future 
revenue flows. 
Despite the challenges outlined above, if, as its proponents claim, those owning land, 
property or business in an area where a station or road access point is to be built will gain 
financially, it seems fair that they should contribute to the financing of this investment. Given 
the boundary issues referred to above (e.g., TIF and SAD), consideration should be given to 
employing such instruments across a number of local authorities. As both residential and 
commercial property owners in the vicinity of transport improvements may profit, and whilst a 
certain amount of resistance is to be expected, there has to be recognition that any profiteering 
is not possible without a public contribution in some form. It is therefore recommended that 
policy makers review the fiscal incentives associated with the various VC funding instruments 
to ensure they create the right incentives for sustainable long-term investment.  
 
 
NOTES 
 
1 HMT (2012a) announced a new approach to PPPs, dubbed PF2, with one of the proposed reforms being an 
increase in equity financing to 20-25%in order to encourage new sources of long-term funding from capital 
markets and institutional investors. 
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2 Monoline insurers focus on operating in one specific financial area and give investors and issuers confidence 
to participate in the market by providing financial protection. Bonds insured by these companies are 
sometimes said to be "wrapped" by the insurer. 
3 These are short-term finance instruments used to pay off income-producing construction or commercial 
properties, usually repayable in three to five years.  
4 A school of economists characterised by a belief that government policy should not interfere with the 
operation of natural economic laws and that land is the source of all wealth.  
5 Also known as Benefit Assessment District, Business Improvement District (BID) and Local Improvement 
District (LID). The term SAD is used throughout this paper. 
6 A UGB is a mapped line that separates land that can be developed from land where development is prohibited, 
to promote density, stop sprawl and protect farmland. 
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